Buchan Alpha: A Norsk Saga

By Jim Rae - Principal, Scientia et Sagacitas Limited, Aberdeen

Shetland is a beautiful but natural wild place, where the wind blows strongly off the sea. In times of old, the inhabiting Vikings would seek shelter and warmth around blazing fires in suitably robust low-profile dwellings and tell stories of great events and adventures. The Norse saga was born.

It starts with a great vessel being towed into the comparably sheltered waters of “Dales Voe”, North of Lerwick, Shetland. With the “Help” of some tribal chiefs and co-adventurers on the UK Mainland, the operators at the new base were able to secure the contract to deconstruct a complicated design of floating production installation, designated – Buchan Alpha.

However, on Sunday 3, November, Her Majesty’s Coastguard Operations Centre at Shetland got a call at 9.20am saying that the remnants of the Buchan Alpha installation had broken loose from its moorings due to strong winds and rough seas and had gone aground on the western side of “Dales Voe”. They noted it was for the Harbour Authority to respond to.

They reported that no pollution was found and it was only the lower framework of the installation that was left and was grounded. Although, no oil was present, the remnants did constitute pollution, so the MCA asked for a POLREP (Pollution Report) to be issued.  All the standard addressees for Scotland were included on this, as was the Shetland Island Council. There were no specific environmental sensitivities at the grounding location.

HM Coastguard informed the duty counter pollution officer and reported that the Lerwick Harbour Master was aware and on his way out to the scene on the tug ‘Knab’. The Harbour Master confirmed the condition at the scene, including the fact that there was no pollution. He also mentioned that the location of the grounding did not present a danger to shipping/navigation. The weather at the time was rough and blowing the metal frame against the shore.  The Harbour Master deemed that nothing further could be done on the 3rd (November) and stated that a dive survey would be needed before any plans to remove the framework from the shore could be attempted.

Bad weather continued for several days and no recovery action was possible.

Previously, various industry professionals had questioned the decision to tow the vessel into the sheltered waters of “Dales Voe”, principally on the grounds of safety and counselled that the area was not well-suited for the job. However, the decision to move the vessel allegedly reduced the rewards and some of the planned works were reorganised accordingly. Also, apparently unbeknownst to the selected bidder, Veolia UK, the vessel owners contrived to remove navigational and buoyancy control systems before the installation initially moored (successfully) at the quayside.

So there you have it. But, who should take charge of the incident; what should they do; and, to whom should they be ultimately responsible? A wall of silence descended until July 2020, when your intrepid writer started asking pertinent questions. Here is what he heard from MCA and the other regulators involved:-

MCA (Maritime & Coastguard Agency): Statement

“The last enquiry from HM Coastguard to the Lerwick Harbour Master was on 10 November at which time we were told no survey had been possible and no recovery action taken. Because the incident represented no apparent pollution threat, HM Coastguard closed the incident on 15 November. The commercial operator for the de-commissioning/dismantle had the responsibility to resolve this and recover the wreckage, with the Harbour Authority responsible for ensuring that appropriate action was taken.”

OGA (The Oil & Gas Authority)

“The OGA works with BEIS to assess decommissioning programmes on the basis of cost, future alternative use and collaboration. The OGA also works with operators to ensure they can demonstrate that their contracting strategies are comprehensive and well positioned to deliver best value in accordance with their decommissioning programme.

Operators and their supply chain are required to ensure that decommissioning must be undertaken safely and cost effectively, in accordance with all regulatory requirements and decisions on the awarding of contracts for this work are commercial decisions made by operators.

The OGA is engaging with Repsol Sinopec Resources UK on its progress with dismantling the Buchan Alpha platform to ensure lessons are learned for future decommissioning projects.”

OPRED (Attributed to Wendy Kennedy OBE, Chief Executive at Offshore Petroleum Regulator and Decommissioning, BEIS)

“Whilst OPRED do not have any overarching responsibility to oversee the onshore disposal work, once we became aware of the incident you mention, we made sure that the proper authorities were already aware of it. Work undertaken at decommissioning yards is the responsibility of the Health and Safety Executive onshore section in regard to safety issues and the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) in regard to waste management.”

“The Offshore Petroleum regulator for Environment and Decommissioning has regulatory responsibility for approving the Decommissioning Programme for offshore oil and gas platforms and operators have to provide a timeframe in which the removal and the disposal of the platform will take place. In the case of the Buchan Alpha Decommissioning Programme, the work is still within the agreed timeframes. If they move outside of this timeframe, a revision to the Decommissioning Programme would be required and we would of course consult stakeholders on this revision.”

HSE (The Health & Safety Executive)

“HSE are responsible for the regulation of offshore installations throughout the decommissioning and dismantling phases with operational strategies for both onshore and offshore work in place.  Energy Division is responsible for offshore activities until the point where the installation is removed from the 500m zone.  During the transit to shore this is classed as a marine activity and is not regulated by HSE, however, once onshore (or alongside) this is regulated jointly by HSE Construction Division and Field Operations Division (FOD).”

“A joint visit to site was held by Energy Division and FOD to ensure smooth transition between divisions and regulatory regimes.  A further site visit was then completed by FOD and at this time the mooring failure was discussed.”

“Once it lost its mooring the Buchan Alpha and its recovery became the regulatory responsibility of MCA and is therefore out with our jurisdiction.  However, HSE recognised the need to better understand the circumstances surrounding the original mooring failure prior to recovery to site and specialist marine resource was secured from Energy Division to support in this area.  Although delayed by recent COVID developments, this resource is still allocated and follow up inspections will be completed, as planned, before recovery to shore.”

Before I round off the story, two further inputs to the narrative. A somewhat surprising comment from Brenda Wylie, OGA – Northern North Sea and West of Shetland Area Manager: - “I must of missed this incident when it was reported in the media.”

And a message received anonymously – “I was one of the two project mariners that took over from Repsol when the rig entered Lerwick Harbour. Although I walked after two weeks (The first time in my working life that started in 1973 that I have not seen a job through to completion) I have kept tabs on the “progress” of the project ever since. I am covered by a Confidentiality Agreement, however, someone somewhere needs to wise up! In fact, a lot of people, across the spectrum of all those involved do.”                

So, who do you think is responsible? Does it not strike you, as it did me, that “UK Decom PLC” doesn’t seem to be that integrated an organisation and MCA even commented that “OPRED have never contacted us on a decommissioning programme submission at the consultative stage”.

The story is far from over. It seems to me, there are a lot of people involved in this Buchan Alpha “Mess” that need to take a long hard look at what they do and how they do it. In over 23 years of practical, hands-on involvement in managing and delivering decommissioning projects, I have never seen anything like it..

Read the latest issue of the OGV Energy magazine HERE.